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Elimination of Gender-Related Employment Disparities
through Statistical Process Control
I. Introduction and Background
The median gender earnings ratio in the United States stands at .80, with full-time
working women in 2007 earning 80 cents for every dollar earned by men (U.S. Department of
Labor, 2007). Employment discrimination explains at least part of the gender earnings gap; other
explanations include women working in fields, employers, and industries that pay less than those
in which men work; women’s lower levels of human capital; and fewer hours worked by women
(Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 2006). Unfortunately, the multiple sources of the gender earnings
gap are virtually impossible to disentangle fully, a primary problem being disagreement over the
characterization of worker behavior that is neither clearly voluntary nor clearly the result of
employment discrimination (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer, 2006).
We do not resolve this issue. Instead we offer a unique, industry-based approach to
tackling persistent gender disparities in earnings and employment in the U.S. economy. We
propose that through the principles and tools of statistical process control (SPC), enforcement
agencies can more accurately identify discriminatory employers for investigation, enforcement,
and/or assistance (Deming, 1986). Although SPC theories typically focus on production
processes, it also makes sense to apply them to employer human resource management processes
and resultant EEO outcomes (MacCarthy and Wasusri, 2002). Application of SPC to the
employment context underscores the point that system factors are substantially more determinant
of EEO outcomes than currently recognized, raising the possibility of a fundamental mismatch
between public policy and the nature of employment discrimination.
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With its focus on outcomes, SPC is also an ideal tool with which to tackle complex types
of discrimination that may be less visible than discrimination of the past. Today’s discrimination
may be more likely to accumulate over time, occur across multiple human resource management
practices, or stem from subconsciously-held attitudes (Bendick, 2007; Graham, Hotchkiss and
Gerhart, 2000; Reskin, 2000). Seemingly in tune with complex forms of employment
discrimination, the primary federal enforcers of employment discrimination laws in the U.S. -the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) – recently intensified their focus on systemic employer
discrimination, or “pattern or practice, policy and/or class cases where the alleged discrimination
has a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic location” (Silverman,
2006). For example, the EEOC doubled the number of systemic charges from fiscal year 2006
(11 charges) to fiscal year 2007 (24 charges), and substantially increased the number of class
action charges (U.S. EEOC, 2007a). Similarly, the OFCCP in its compliance reviews of federal
contractors now assesses whether gender- or race under-representation may stem from systemic
discrimination (Silberman, 2008). But these systemic approaches, as practiced, may actually
worsen EEO performance over time because they violate some basic tenets of SPC (Shewhart,
1939). These tenets include: (a) recognition that the majority of variation in outcomes is due to
“common” causes (i.e., the influence of similar factors across all employers in an industry) as
opposed to “special” causes (i.e., the actions of individual employers); and (b) management
intervention only for purposes of remedying problems that are clearly attributable to special
causes, based upon formal outlier identification procedures.
We incorporate industry into our statistical process control (SPC) application since the
employment processes of firms are shaped to a large extent by industry norms, practices, and
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industries’ economic and business environments (Baron and Bielby, 1980; Gersen, 2007;
Krueger and Summers, 1988). Firm-level, gender-related employment disparities are enduringly
intertwined with the industries in which they occur. In addition, the form of gender disparities
will vary by industry. In SPC terms, then, industry can be considered a “common” cause of
gender disparities because all firms within an industry are affected.1 This highlights the fact that
the meager public resources currently devoted to collaborative, industry-based EEO
interventions are inversely related to their potential impact.
To summarize, we propose an application of theories of SPC, and an outcomes-based
Gender EEO Scorecard at the industry level, to address three shortcomings in current U.S.
government anti-discrimination efforts: (1) an atheoretical approach to prioritizing and designing
agency enforcement efforts; (2) an inadequate emphasis on the industry setting(s) in which
employing firms operate, and (3) the lack of systemic tools for joint consideration of all parts of
the employment process: pay, hiring, job placement, and promotion, for multiple protected
classes (e.g., gender and race).
An underlying assumption of this paper is that raising the gender earnings ratio is a
worthy goal, regardless of the degree to which employment discrimination is involved. This is
because women’s lower earnings have negative implications for their work participation
decisions, earnings, and long-term economic security (Rose and Hartmann, 2004). Furthermore,
there are potential competitive and equity costs associated with gender-related disparities in
employment (McAdams, 1995).
We begin the paper with an introduction and application of statistical process control to
the EEO enforcement context, followed by a discussion of the importance of industry setting to
understanding gender-related employment disparities. After introducing the Systemic Gender
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EEO Scorecard, we suggest better ways of identifying employers for systemic discrimination
enforcement and ideas for accelerated improvements to women’s employment outcomes. As part
of the latter we provide an empirical illustration with Current Population Survey data. Finally,
we generate policy recommendations for EEO agencies.
II. A New Theoretical Lens: Statistical Process Control and EEO Performance
A. Introduction to SPC
Statistical process control, a method used primarily for improving production processes
in manufacturing settings, is a key tool of total quality management programs and successor Six
Sigma initiatives, all of which aim to prevent product defects rather than remedy them postproduction (Rath and Strong, 2003). SPC rests on the premise that all processes exhibit both
random and non-random variation, and that the type of variation provides clues as to the most
effective process improvement interventions (Shewhart, 1939). Managers and engineers track
production data through “control charts” to detect patterns and outliers that indicate non-random,
or special, causes of variation that need further investigation. SPC and control charts are
essentially analysis of variance techniques in formats that are more accessible to managers and
employees (Kolesar, 1993a).
In the total quality management setting, work teams typically isolate and try to eliminate
special causes of variation in order to stabilize production processes and render them more
predictable. The creation of a stable process is a necessary condition for further process
improvements, because only stable processes will exhibit the normal distribution of observations
necessary for probabilistic inferences about processes (Shewhart, 1939; Tukey, 1977 as cited in
Deming, 1986). Importantly, erroneously attributing variation to special causes and designing
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corresponding remedies will destabilize and actually increase process variation (Deming, 1986;
Shewhart, 1939).
In the SPC literature there is a widespread assumption that the majority of process
variation is attributable to common factors, or inherent process features (Shewhart, 1939; Latzko
and Saunders, 1995). For example, Deming estimates that common causes account for 94% of
total variation in production processes, and that special causes account for only the remaining
6% (Deming, 1986: 315). However, an empirical examination of 66 industry cases revealed that
for unstable processes, common cause variation comprised a minimum of 30% of total variation,
with an average of 50% (Grabov, 1998). It also appears that the proportions of special and
common causes of variation depend in part upon the assumptions regarding the relative impact of
workers and systems on work outputs (Anderson, Rungtusanatham, and Schroeder, 1994;
Kolesar, 1993a). Nevertheless, almost all scholars and practitioners acknowledge substantial,
consequential common cause influence on production variation.2
B. SPC and Current EEO Enforcement Efforts
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of the U.S. Department of
Labor enforces employment discrimination statutes (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964) through the following efforts: a) collecting annual EEO-1 staffing data from employers
with 100 or more employees or federal contractors with 50 or more employees; b) receiving,
investigating, conciliating, and litigating employment discrimination complaints; c) initiating
systemic discrimination charges against employers with potentially egregious or widespread
discriminatory practices; and d) educating and offering assistance to employees and employers
on EEO requirements and procedures. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP) of the U.S. Department of Labor oversees the EEO efforts of federal contractors by
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monitoring required affirmative action plans, auditing employers on their compliance efforts, and
to a lesser extent, conducting employer outreach and education, and receiving employee
complaints.3 The EEOC tends to perform a larger number of investigations with smaller
employer sanctions, while the OFCCP does fewer investigations that produce larger sanctions
(Edwards, 1991/1992). The OFCCP has more legislative authority and flexibility than the EEOC
in obtaining employer data; however, the political influence of employer groups, limited
resources, and legislation such as the Paperwork Reduction Acts of 1980 and 1995 (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2008), place practical limits on both agencies.
The current enforcement strategies of the EEOC and OFCCP are aligned only partially
with SPC tenets. Neither the EEOC’s newly revamped systemic discrimination charge system
nor the OFCCP’s recent systemic emphasis in its audits appear to rely on any theoretical
justification for identifying poor EEO performance relative to other firms in the industry. The
EEOC’s current system of developing systemic discrimination charges based upon the judgments
of district offices and other compilations of anecdotal evidence (Silverman, 2006) and the
OFCCP’s formula for selecting employers for compliance audits (2008c) potentially would be
characterized as harmful tampering according to SPC theories (Deming, 1986). The systemic
enforcement processes of both agencies are described in more detail in the following section.
If common causes of variation in employment processes predominate as suggested by
SPC theories, then in order to fully and most dramatically address gender-related employment
disparities in the U.S. economy, entire systems of employment must be improved. At present,
however, the EEOC and the OFCCP place little priority on system-wide outreach and education
interventions. For example, in Fiscal Year 2007, the EEOC devoted approximately 5.2% of its
expenditures to outreach and the training on EEO compliance, with almost its entire budget
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devoted to enforcement and litigation aimed at individual employers.4 To summarize, we are
making the case for parsing the sources of gender-related employment disparities into common
causes and special causes in order to highlight why an expansion of EEOC and OFCCP activities
is necessary.
III. Industry Context as a Critical Common Cause of EEO Performance
A. Linking Firm Behavior at the Industry Level
The industries in which firms operate influence firm-level economic performance,
employment processes, and the levels of gender-related employment disparities in the U.S.
economy (Baron and Bielby, 1980). To a substantial degree, firms in the same industry will
experience similar outcomes across business cycles and over time, due to the influence of
industry characteristics of product demand, domestic and international competition, growth rates,
profitability, technological advancements, and other factors (McGahan and Porter, 2002; Short,
Ketchen, Palmer and Hult, 2007). Arguably, some industry influences are more stable (e.g.,
industry structure) than others (e.g., business cycles) (Hawawini, Subramanian, and Verdin,
2003).
Industry is a key component of the social structures in which firms operate (Krueger and
Summers, 1988; White, 1981). Firms are subject to normative, resource-dependence, and
economic pressures to conform to accepted industry practices (Alessandri and Khan, 2006;
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), including employment processes that reflect discriminatory norms
or “tastes” for discrimination (Black and Brainerd, 2002; Gersen, 2007; Johnson and Solon,
1986). The supply-side determinants of employment outcomes, which are not the focus of our
paper, are best described from a human capital perspective and manifest themselves in
differences across educational levels and occupational attainment (Becker, 1993).5
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The intensity of the institutional pressures to which firms are subject can vary over time
and as a function of market forces (Dacin, 1997). Not surprisingly, firm responses to these
pressures will vary as well, based upon firm characteristics such as size, age, and the degree of
embeddedness in the industry (Granovetter, 1985; Miller and Chen, 1996). This is important
because economic performance is related to the exercise of discriminatory power (for example,
see Hotchkiss and Pitts, forthcoming). In addition, less-regulated industries will have more
leeway to discriminate than more-regulated industries (Johnson, 1978). Despite these
complexities, the fact remains that industry-based relationships will be among firms’ closest and
most influential connections with other firms.
Generally, neoclassical economic theory posits that competition and profit penalties for
discriminators will eliminate employment discrimination. There is empirical support for the
contention that product market competition reduces employment discrimination over time
(Ashenfelter and Hannan, 1986; Peoples and Heywood, 2006). On the other hand, firms’
responses to these pressures may be inhibited by industry norms and imperfect markets (Akerlof,
1985; Coleman, 2004); as well as human tendencies to favor similar others as a means to
enhance individual well-being (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; McAdams, 1995; Wooten and James,
2004).
B. Consideration of Industry in Current EEO Efforts
1. EEOC. The 2007-2012 strategic plan of the EEOC (U.S. EEOC, 2006) calls for proactive
prevention of employment discrimination and the use of strategic enforcement and litigation;
however, the lack of attention to industry context diminishes the power of the document. In the
strategic plan, prevention strategies focused on educating workers and managers do not refer to
the industries in which individuals reside nor do they recognize that various industries may house
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or perpetuate different types of discrimination. This is a critical oversight. In addition, the plan
devolves strategic planning regarding systemic discrimination to each of the 15 EEOC district
offices, enabling inconsistent emphases on industry context.
To a certain extent, the EEOC has considered industry in carrying out its responsibilities
for many years (Ronald Edwards, Ph.D., Director of Program Research and Surveys Division,
Office of Research, Information and Planning, EEOC, personal interview, June 21, 2007).
Statistical analyses to support or initiate complaint investigations are more comparable for job
groups within the same industries. In addition, EEOC field offices may share information about
cases occurring in the same industries, and EEOC researchers have examined industry-based
options for identifying systemic discriminators (Cartwright and Edwards, 2003). In sum, there
appears to be some, but not overwhelming, consideration of industry by the EEOC at present.
2. OFCCP. The OFCCP has an advantage over the EEOC in terms of greater access to employer
data through its routine compliance audits of federal contractor affirmative action plans.6 From
2001-2007, an average of approximately 4,500 compliance audits were conducted per year, or
about 2.4% of the approximately 93,000 non-construction and 100,000 construction firms that
are federal contractors (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008a, 2008b). The audits can encompass all
employment activities. In the 1970’s, the OFCCP selected contractors for compliance reviews
with what appeared to be unsystematic, ad hoc processes, despite having formal targeting
systems available (Heckman and Wolpin, 1976; Leonard, 1985). The informality of the OFCCP
at this time resulted in the counterintuitive result that the firms with the lowest proportions of
women and minorities were the least likely to be reviewed (Leonard, 1985). From the mid-1980s
until 2000, the OFCCP selected contractors for review using the Equal Employment Data System
(EEDS), which compared staffing rates by gender and race/ethnicity based upon EEO-1 data to
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industry and regional averages, and it relied to a lesser extent upon the discretion of OFCCP
district directors to flag firms for compliance audits (Federal Register, 2006a; U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO), 1995).
The Clinton Administration instituted an extensive firm-level Equal Opportunity Survey
(EOS) on pay and other employment outcomes, one aim of which was to target federal
contractors with poor EEO records (Hodgson and Cooper, 2000). However, in 2006 the EOS was
replaced by the current Federal Contractor Selection System (FCSS), which relies in part on an
externally-developed statistical formula for selecting federal contractors for compliance reviews
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2008c). The OFCCP takes pains to emphasize the “neutrality” of its
current audit selection procedures, defining neutrality as subjecting all contractors to the same
audit selection criteria (Patsy Blackshear, Ph.D., OFCCP Director of Program Operations,
personal interview, February 12, 2008). However, the OFCCP website indicates that the factors
of establishment size and other “multiple factors” are utilized to identify “the likelihood of
finding systemic discrimination” by a particular contractor (U.S. DOL, 2008c). It is unclear
whether the OFCCP oversamples firms in industries with high complaint rates or with histories
of underrepresentation of women and minorities, but contractor performance is normed within
industry (U.S. DOL, 2008c) and the agency acknowledges concentrating its resources on the
“worst offenders” (U.S. DOL, 2008d).
IV. Illustration of SPC in EEO Enforcement
A. Overview
We provide a roadmap for and illustration of the use of SPC in EEO enforcement, using
Current Population Survey data and the Systemic Gender Disparity Scorecard, which we discuss
in the next section. This proposed application of SPC by federal enforcement agencies involves
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the identification and remediation of special causes of within-industry EEO variation, followed
by industry-wide problem-solving initiatives tailored to the industry or industries in which
employers operate. The latter step is the focus of this paper, although the first step is discussed
also. With this illustration we aim to render visible our contention that the SPC approach is
superior to the current enforcement strategies in terms of theoretical soundness and the potential
to eliminate gender-related employment disparities more quickly.
B. The Systemic Gender Disparity Scorecard as a Means to Assess EEO Progress
The Systemic Gender Disparity Scorecard is a proposed comprehensive tool for assessing
gender-related EEO performance at the employer or industry level (cite blinded). Because the
Scorecard assesses multiple types of gender-related employment disparities simultaneously, it
recognizes the possibility that firms that do not discriminate in one activity (e.g., hiring), may
discriminate in others (e.g., promotions); and that the forms of discrimination may shift in the
presence of enforcement attention or other factors.
The five components of the G-EEO Scorecard are as follows (additional detail on the
construction of each component, and how the components are combined into a single index, is
presented in Appendix A):
1) The "Equal Pay Component" measures the extent to which the employer pays women and
men in the same jobs and the same human capital characteristics the same pay.
2) The "Occupational Segregation Component" measures the extent to which an employer’s
workforce is integrated, by gender, across jobs and occupations.
3) The "Glass Ceiling Component" measures the extent to which women are represented in
the upper levels of the organization.
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4) The "Hiring Component" measures the extent to which women and men are proportionally
represented in occupations and firms relative to their levels of availability in the relevant
labor market.
5) The "Related Discrimination Component" considers the scores on the separate
components from the perspective of race/ethnicity.7
The Scorecard provides a more comprehensive picture of EEO performance than current
methods, because it evaluates all aspects of the employment process. For example, both the
OFCCP and EEOC sometimes analyze employers’ annual EEO-1 reports for potential signs of
systemic discrimination, but EEO-1 reports contain only staffing data, to the neglect of
information on other important employment decisions (e.g., pay levels) covered by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Underscoring this point, human resource management scholars
recognize that staffing is but one part of an inter-related human resource system (Becker,
Huselid, and Ulrich 2001; Petersen and Saporta, 2004). In addition, the Scorecard also has
advantages over gender claim rate data because complaint filing statistics may be driven by
factors other than the actual degree of discrimination (Goldman, 2003; Stangor, Swim, Van
Allen, and Sechrist, 2002).
C. Step 1: Identification of Special Causes
The first step in the SPC process is to chart EEO outcomes for firms in each industry, for
purposes of identifying special causes of variation for further investigation. In order to ensure
that these special causes will be identifiable, Shewhart (1939) and subsequent quality experts
recommend parsing the data into meaningful subgroups. We examine broad industry subgroups.
Two types of charts are useful in the context of our paper: 1) a range chart, which highlights
unusually wide variation in an employer’s EEO outcomes over time; and 2) an X-bar chart,
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which draws attention to employers with unusually high or low EEO performance relative to
other firms in the industry. Standard SPC procedure recommends that poorly performing firms
be investigated further for the possibility of systemic discrimination charges by the EEOC or
sanctions by the OFCCP. It is expected that these “hard core discriminators” will constitute
between 6.5% and 12% of employers (Bendick and Egan, 2000; Federal Register, 2006b).
Consistent with the need to minimize “false positives” or erroneous conclusions that an
employer is a systemic discriminator when it is not (i.e., Type I error), the identification of
employers should focus only on extreme outliers or unusual patterns of variation.8 According to
conventional industry practice, this means attending to only those employers performing at least
3 standard deviations worse than the industry average (Kolesar, 1993a; Shewhart, 1939).
Alternatively, the threshold could be set at 6 standard deviations from the mean, consistent with
Six Sigma quality programs (Rath and Strong, 2003).9 Figure 1A presents a range chart and
Figure 1B presents an X-bar control chart for hypothetical data on firms in the service industry.10
[Insert Figure IA and Figure IB about here]
Figure IA graphs each employer’s range of EEO Scorecard values (i.e., highest EEO
scores minus lowest EEO scores) over a 5-year period, for 30 hypothetical employers.11 The
Scorecard ranges from 0 (good performance) to 1 (poor performance) by design, and the
employer data in Figure IA range from .059 to .20. Employer 5’s range of .20 exceeds the three
standard-deviation threshold, indicating that Employer 5 has a range of EEO scores that greatly
exceeds other firms’ in the industry. This finding warrants further investigation. From an
enforcement standpoint, the EEOC or OFCCP would be interested in performance declines that
appear to reflect discrimination.
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The X-bar chart, which reports each employer’s EEO score for one year, is more relevant
than the range chart in an EEO context. Figure IB indicates that Employer 16’s EEO
performance is more than 3 standard deviations worse than other employers in the industry.
Again, the federal enforcement agencies should investigate this situation further to assess
whether there is a plausible explanation for this result or whether it signals systemic
discrimination. No other employer would be flagged for systemic enforcement attention because
they are exhibiting normal random variation for the industry in which they are situated. The fact
that all of the other employers’ ranges fall within the three standard-deviation control limits is
positive in that it indicates some degree of process stability (Deming, 1986).
D. Step 2: Identification of Common Causes of EEO Variation Within Industry Subgroups
We begin with the SPC assumption that employment outcome variation within industries
is due substantially and perhaps primarily to system factors or common causes (Deming, 1986).
As discussed throughout this paper, we focus on industry as a key common cause of employer
EEO performance, and we recognize that different industries may have different common causes
of gender-related EEO performance. To help prioritize which industries should receive the most
enforcement attention, and to provide clues as to the nature of industry influences, we
recommend cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of the Systemic Gender EEO Scorecard
data, by industry.
To illustrate this approach, we compiled data from the combined outgoing rotation
groups from the March, April, May, and June Current Population Surveys (CPS) for 1989-2000,
reporting the cross-sectional results for the year 2000. CPS samples from each month were
matched to the March file in order to obtain important determinants of labor market participation
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(used in the estimation of wage outcomes). These months are combined in order to obtain as
large a sample of workers in each industry as possible.
In the CPS, each industry in the data is comprised of multiple employers producing
similar goods or services. Six broad industry groups are analyzed: manufacturing; mining and
construction; transportation, communication, and utilities; retail and wholesale trade; service;
and finance, insurance, and real estate.12 In the CPS data, we examine 33,662 observations (std.
dev. 3,703) in the year 2000, and the average sample size for the years 1989-2000 is 35,937.13
Table I contains some means across industries for the year 2000. The service, retail and
wholesale trade, and manufacturing are the industries employing the greatest percentages of
workers. The representation of women is lowest in the mining and construction industry and
highest in the finance, insurance, and real estate industry and in the service industry.
[Insert Table I about here]
Table II presents the EEO Scorecard components and results for each industry in the year
2000. The component values are reported along with their standardized values (in bold). The
standardized values demonstrate if performance on any one component is one standard deviation
different than the market average.14 A negative value indicates that the industry is performing
worse than the market average, and a positive value means the industry is performing better than
the market average, and the overall Scorecard is standardized in the same way. The five
components combine to produce an overall Scorecard for each industry reported in the last row
of Table II.
[Insert Table II about here]
Both the manufacturing, and retail and wholesale trade industries performed within one
standard deviation of the market average on all components, resulting in Scorecard values that
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also fall within market norms. The service industry performed above market norms in all but one
component, resulting in a Scorecard for that industry that is farthest above the market norm
overall. The finance, insurance, and real estate industry is overall slightly above the market
norm, with poor performance in Equal Pay being offset by good performance on the Glass
Ceiling and Related Discrimination components. Both the mining and construction industry, and
the transportation, communication, and utilities industry have scores below the market norm.
The mining and construction industry’s poor Scorecard was driven by its significantly below
average performance on three out of the five components. The poor performance by
transportation, communication, and utilities on the Hiring Component was enough to push that
industry outside the market norm overall.
The Systemic Gender EEO Scorecard can be mapped over time as well to illustrate trends
in industries’ EEO performances and to establish the robustness of the cross-sectional results.
We plotted each industry's annual standardized Scorecard for the years 1989-2000. These results
indicate that mining and construction industry has fallen consistently below the market norm.
And while consistently above the market norm, the service industry has shown a slight, steady
decline over the time period (p < .05). Finance, insurance, and real estate is an example of an
industry that has improved its performance over the period (p < .01), falling above the market
norm in the most recent two years. All other trends are not significant. We interpret this trend
analysis with some caution as it does not fully consider changes in industry composition and
structure over time (Tomaskovic-Devey, Zimmer, Stainback, Robinson, Taylor, and McTague,
2006).
[Insert Figure II about here]
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We also obtained EEOC complaint data by industry through a Freedom of Information
Act Request, in order to compare complaint rates with our results. We find that complaint rates
and Scorecard values are correlated significantly, providing some evidence of the validity of the
Scorecard metric. Specifically, the Scorecard results over time are positively correlated with
EEOC complaints by industry (r = .85; p < .01), for the years 1992-2000, which is similar to the
results found by Gersen (2007). The Scorecard results also parallel the ranking of industries by
complaint rate data.
V. Discussion
A. EEO Enforcement, Statistical Process Control and Industry
Our paper offers a new industry-based approach to eradicating gender disparities in
employment. We apply the lens of statistical process control theory from the quality management
literature (Deming, 1986; Shewhart, 1939) to the federal enforcement of EEO laws, for the
purpose of accelerating EEO progress in a manner that is theoretically sound, resource efficient,
and fair to employers and employees. We also hope to redirect the stalled discussion regarding
the precise amount of employment discrimination in the U.S. economy, toward a dialogue about
potential collaborative efforts between enforcement agencies and industry trade groups. Our
paper is motivated in part by past and current research that raises serious questions regarding the
rationality and efficacy of EEOC and OFCCP’s enforcement efforts (Heckman and Wolpin,
1976; Hirsh, 2008; Leonard, 1985), particularly given today’s more complex forms of gender
discrimination (Graham et al., 2000; Krieger and Fiske, 2006).
Incorporating SPC into EEO enforcement methods represents a major improvement over
less formal methods of systemic discrimination charge development currently utilized by the
EEOC and OFCCP. SPC has the added advantage of being diffused widely, and it is accepted in
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the business world as an effective continuous improvement approach (Corbett, Montes-Sancho,
and Kirsch, 2005). SPC relies upon basic theories of distribution, variation, and probability to
balance the interests of employers and employees in ensuring that systemic discriminators are
likely to be detected and that non-discriminators are not selected for enforcement action. Control
charts for each industry help identify when employer-level intervention is necessary and when it
will result in (undesirable) wider variation in employer EEO performance. The empirical
analyses in this paper were not designed to predict which industries might contain the greatest
number of poorly performing outliers. However, reductions in the number of outliers should be
seen in each industry over time as the intervention methods described in this paper are applied.
An even greater contribution of SPC to the EEO enforcement process, however, is its
potential to accelerate reductions in the gender earnings gap and in other gender-related
employment disparities by focusing attention on “common causes” of EEO variation. Failing to
incorporate the concept of common causes into enforcement activities will risk future EEO
progress (Deming, 1986). When applied to the EEO context, this suggests that special factors
such as the actions of individual employers, have less influence on EEO outcomes than common
factors that affect all employers in an industry. Whether or not the common cause predominance
holds in the EEO context remains an open empirical question; however, there is no doubt that
common causes of employment processes are substantial and consequential.
Bielby and Baron (1980) advocated “bringing the firms back in” to model and
understand individual-level employment outcomes more completely. Sometimes
overlooked, however, is that their paper also emphasized the importance of industry to
firm-level outcomes. We overlay SPC with this sociological work to conceptualize
industry as a common cause of employment outcomes at the firm level. At present, U.S.
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EEO enforcement agencies devote little attention to industry and to common causes of
firm-level EEO performance. The results presented in Table II and Figure II provide
vital guidance to policy makers who will also need to design a common cause
remediation approach. Options include emphasizing one or a combination of the
following: (a) industries with the worst overall EEO performance; (b1) the worst
subcomponent of each industry (Finance – e.g., Equal Pay); (b2) the worst performer for
each component (e.g., Hiring – transportation, communication and utilities industry); or
(c) the combination of subcomponents with the greatest potential to eradicate gender
employment disparities most quickly, which would require more complex mathematical
analyses (Kolesar 1993a). Criteria “b1” and “b2” from above would ensure that common
cause remediation efforts are spread over multiple industries but only under “b1” would
every industry receive assistance and attention.
According to criterion “a”, Scorecard results indicate that the mining and
construction industry is the poorest EEO performer, with occupational segregation being
its primary weakness (i.e., a standardized component value of -1.751), followed by glass
ceiling and race/ethnic disparities. In order to more fully understand this occupational
segregation, we encourage further investigation of this industry. For example, digging
deeper we find that in the mining and construction industry, men are concentrated in
production, craft and repair occupations (62% of men versus 9% of women), while
women are concentrated in administrative (34% of women versus 13% of men) and
technician positions (47% of women versus 2% of men) (not presented in tables).
Therefore, common cause remediation in the mining and construction industry should
focus on industry-wide solutions to this extreme occupational segmentation.
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Worthy of future research is examination of potential correlates of EEO Scorecard
results. We observe that two of the three more heavily unionized industries – mining and
construction and transportation, communications and utilities – also had the worst EEO
performance. One possibility is that contractually-based seniority systems in these
industries slow EEO progress relative to less unionized industries. Or union pressure to
reduce pay dispersion may have a secondary effect of decreasing the gender earnings gap,
making EEO performance in these industries better than what it might otherwise have
been (Elvira and Saporta, 2001). We also observe that two of the industries with better
EEO performance – finance, insurance, and real estate; and service – contain occupations
with high proportions of professionals. A relationship between proportions of white collar
workers and positive EEO performance would be consistent with Leonard’s (1985)
finding that OFCCP compliance efforts were targeted to these types of occupations. On
the other hand the opposite trends over time for these two industries (see Figure II)
suggest a more complicated story.
B. Contribution of the Systemic Gender EEO Scorecard
The Systemic Gender EEO Scorecard is a comprehensive tool for assessing employer and
industry EEO performance, aggregating outcomes on five EEO sub-components: equal pay,
occupational segregation, glass ceiling issues, hiring outcomes, and race/ethnic EEO progress.
Because the Scorecard assesses multiple employment processes, it is capable of accounting for
complex forms of discrimination. The Scorecard makes it easier detect small or subtle gender
biases, and biases that transform over time in response to regulatory pressure. For example,
Figure II shows that the finance, insurance, and real estate industry appears to have made some
real EEO progress over time; however, the Scorecard results for the Equal Pay component
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highlight a potentially serious unequal pay problem. Another benefit of assessing industry
performance on five different potential forms of employment discrimination is that policy
resources can be tailored to the type of gender disparities that are most prevalent in a particular
industry. Finally, unlike current regulatory tools the Scorecard permits consideration of betweenand within-employer (or industry) sources of gender-related earnings differences (Petersen and
Saporta, 2004) in a single metric. For all of these reasons, the Scorecard has the potential to
move the overall economy towards greater gender parity as access and opportunities improve in
each industry (Bergmann, 1974).
The Systemic Gender EEO Scorecard would be useful to both the EEOC and the OFCCP
in enforcement and outreach efforts. For the EEOC, the Scorecard could serve as the metric for
outlier identification and possible systemic charge development. For the OFCCP, the Scorecard
could identify outlier federal contractors for compliance audits of their affirmative action plans
and other human resource management practices, which could lead to sanctions and/or systemic
charge development. Industry-level Scorecard results could provide valuable guidance to both
agencies for expanded education and outreach and industry/agency partnerships. In fact, the
similarity in potential benefits of the Scorecard for the two agencies raises the question of why
the EEOC and OFCCP operate as separate entities. The greatest challenge regarding the
Scorecard will be the political one of justifying more data collection from employers, especially
given the fate of the OFCCP’s EOS Survey (Federal Register 2006b). However, we believe that
the reporting costs to employers will be offset by the fact that SPC methods provide inherent
safeguards from arbitrary or random enforcement activity. Ultimately, policy makers will have to
consider the needs of employees, workers, and the missions of the EEOC and OFCCP in
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improving current enforcement mechanisms and in promoting collaborative industry-based
solutions.
The Systemic Gender EEO Scorecard was developed in the context of the increasing use
of metrics in business and government to guide strategic decisions and target resources where
they will be used most effectively. There are several other EEO-related scorecards that have been
proposed. For example, Mehri, Giampetro-Meyer, and Runnels (2004) developed an EEO
scorecard for inclusion into firms’ annual Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports.
Internal EEO and corporate diversity metrics abound but they are usually not assessed relative to
other firms or industries (e.g., Hubbard, 2004). There are also publications that evaluate the “best
places to work” for women or minorities but these tend to include less objective or self-reported
data on firm diversity performance than our scorecard (e.g., Minority Law Journal, 2006). In
short, our Scorecard appears to be the most developed in terms of measurement and theory, and
it appears to be of most direct use in EEO enforcement agencies.
C. Public Policy Recommendations
We recommend substantial technical changes to the process of systemic charge
development by the EEOC and OFCCP by incorporating statistical methods of outlier
identification for investigation and possible sanctions (Shewhart, 1939; Deming, 1986). This will
involve the use of control charts that treat most employer EEO performance as normal variation
within the industrial system, but will highlight some employer EEO performance as special, or
non-random variation. Enforcement agencies should consider systemic charges only for
employers with substantially worse EEO performance than their industry peers (Bendick and
Egan, 2000; Leonard, 1985). Recognizing outlier employers as special causes has the dual
benefit of avoiding unproductive systemic investigations as well as detecting egregious employer
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discrimination that goes unreported to the EEOC at present (Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Selmi,
2006).
There are serious concerns with relying on employee complaints as the primary means of
eradicating employment discrimination (Hirsh 2008; Selmi, 2006; Krieger & Fiske, 2006).
However, we recommend retention of the complaint-filing system for a couple of reasons.
Complaints that result in substantial EEO settlements likely have an impact within the industry.
For example, it is possible that EEOC sex discrimination settlements with Morgan Stanley (U.S.
EEOC 2004) and other financial firms contributed to the significant improvement in overall EEO
performance in that industry. Second, meritorious discrimination complaints can serve as
evidence of special causes of EEO performance variation. That is, complaints are analogous to
situations where a manager unambiguously observes the misconduct or intentional poor
performance of an individual worker. Treating meritorious complaints in this manner would
alleviate the possibility that SPC could fail to identify some actual systemic discriminators.
Retention of the complaint system is also important to maintaining employees’ procedural
fairness perceptions regarding discrimination claiming.
Our second policy recommendation is that the EEOC and OFCCP incorporate industry
considerations more explicitly into their enforcement and outreach activities. All EEOC Districts
should explicitly identify particular industries for enforcement and other interventions, perhaps
modeled on OSHA’s Local Emphasis Programs (OSHA, 2008a). In addition, both the EEOC and
OFCCP should promote substantive partnerships with industry trade groups and employers to
develop innovative approaches to remove industry-related impediments to EEO progress. These
partnerships should acknowledge that individual non-outlier employers within an industry have
less than complete control over their EEO outcomes, due to the constraints posed by industry-
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related norms, structures, business environments, and other factors (Hawawini et al., 2003;
McGahan and Porter, 2002). Relatedly, according to SPC, it would be counterproductive to
increase the numbers of investigations of employers in industries with poor EEO records, unless
these employers are in fact outliers.
Collaborative enforcement agency / business efforts can be modeled on the quality
improvement methods used by corporations. For example, one manufacturing plant utilizes
teams comprised of production workers, a production engineer, and a facilitator to share
information on current and longer-term production issues; and to help remediate special and
common causes of variation (Field and Sinha, 2005). Collaboration could also be modeled on the
well-developed cooperative programs of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA, 2008b). For example, under the Alliance Program, OSHA works with trade groups and
other stakeholders to develop compliance assistance tools and to share information with
employers. The primary advantages of these collaborative approaches is that they tap into the
knowledge of those who are most familiar with the processes in question (Field and Sinha,
2005), and that collaboration is more likely to be embraced by employers than are sanctions
(Gilliland and Hoffman, 2004).
The key to the success of our proposal is a substantial increase in the resources allocated
to the EEOC and the OFCCP, for purposes of developing innovative solutions to industry
barriers to EEO progress. Merely shifting funds from enforcement activities will result
ineffective application of SPC concepts, for several reasons. First, even in the presence of outlier
evidence, systemic discrimination charge preparation requires substantial amounts of investigator
and statistician resources (Silverman, 2006). Second, substantial resources will need to be
devoted to the establishment of agency-employer collaborative relationships, joint idea
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generation, and implementation of the innovative solutions. It can not be underscored more
forcefully that these collaborative efforts must be substantive rather than symbolic or incremental
(Edelman, 1992; Kolesar, 1993b). Finally, cooperative programs will take place with no
expected reduction in the numbers of employee discrimination complaints, at least in the shortterm. Ultimately, policy makers will have to determine the best mix of current enforcement
mechanisms and collaborative industry-based efforts to promote equal employment opportunity.
VI. Limitations and Future Research
New proposals such as the application of SPC to EEO enforcement require greater
conceptual leaps than incremental contributions, and there are some areas in the paper that we
would like to acknowledge in this vein. First, consistent with SPC, we make the assumption that
some and perhaps most gender disparities in the U.S. result from common causes rather than
special causes (Shewhart, 1939; Deming, 1986). However, the possibility exists that industry
employment process variation is due primarily to special causes (e.g., employer strategies, strong
gender and race / ethnic differences in preferences or life experiences). Fortunately, although this
concern has implications for policy-related resource allocations, it does not change our study’s
recommendations regarding the adoption of complementary systemic enforcement and education
approaches, based in SPC logic, by the EEOC and OFCCP.
A second major limitation of the paper is that we have considered industry in less
complexity than its operation in actual employment processes. To be most effective, enforcement
agencies and employers need to refine, or disaggregate broad industry categories in order to
generate the most useful policy ideas for reducing gender disparities. Moreover, methods for
examining firms operating in multiple industries will need to be developed, and regional and
relevant labor market factors will have to be added in to the equation. All efforts should consider
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the possibility that the importance of industry to firm-level outcomes will differ by sector
(McGahan and Porter, 2002). As a starting point, we recommend an economy-wide replication of
Leonard’s (1985) study using EEOC and OFCCP data to provide a very useful snapshot of
current EEO enforcement processes in the U.S.
VII. Conclusion
The premise of our paper is that in order to effectively reduce gender-related employment
disparities in the U.S. economy the employment processes of entire industries must change. We
suggest the application of statistical process control as a technical and conceptual tool for
understanding employer variation in EEO outcomes, and for guiding policy interventions. We
recommend the Systemic Gender EEO Scorecard or a similar comprehensive metric because it
more readily captures complex forms of discrimination than current measures.
An SPC approach at the industry level using the Systemic Gender Scorecard has the
potential to benefit a diverse group of stakeholders: agency personnel with limited enforcement
resources, employers seeking to improve EEO practices or gain employment-related efficiencies,
and of course, women seeking non-discriminatory workplaces. Tomaskovic-Devey and
colleagues (2006) are somewhat pessimistic regarding future equal employment opportunity
progress absent more powerful public policy interventions. It is our hope that the new lens of
statistical process control will provide a strong rationale for innovation in EEO enforcement.
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Appendix A
Detail on Scorecard Components
1) Equal Pay Component. This will be indicated by the existence of a negative and significant
gender coefficient in a regression of hourly earnings on employees’ gender, race, job
characteristics, and human capital characteristics. The wage regression will also control for selfselection into the labor market (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 1981). This essentially amounts to a
two-step procedure. In the first step, an estimate of each worker's probability of being observed
in the labor market is calculated. This probability is included as a regressor in the second step
estimation of the wage equation.
The coefficient on the female dummy variable is what represents the selectivity-corrected
percentage wage differential. 15 This component of the Scorecard is designed to capture equal
pay discrimination within employers and is designed to encourage employers to use consistent
pay-setting practices and monitor any gender-related pay differences that can not be justified by
merit, seniority, or any factor other than sex. At present, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) receives relatively few equal pay complaints, in part because few
employees have access to the pay information of their co-workers. For the years 1992 through
2000, Equal Pay Act charges constituted less than 2% of individual charge filings with the EEOC
(U.S. EEOC, 2006).
2) Occupational Segregation Component. This will be measured by the well-known Duncan
dissimilarity Scorecard (Duncan and Duncan 1955). The Duncan Scorecard falls between zero
and one and indicates the percent of either men or women that would have to change occupations
in order for the distributions across occupations to be equal. The closer the Scorecard is to zero,
the more equal are the distributions of men and women across occupations. It is calculated as:

34

Occupational Segregationj =

1 n
∑ Mij − F ij ,
2 i =1

where n is the number of occupations represented in industry j, Mij is the proportion of men
employed by industry j found in occupation i, and Fij is the proportion of women employed by
industry j found in occupation i. Because women usually work in lower-paying occupations, this
component is designed to capture excessive and potentially discriminatory occupational
segregation, within employers. Thus employers are encouraged to examine their job placement
processes, as well as consider the implementation of programs to train and encourage women to
enter non-traditional fields (e.g., computer programming). It is possible to score poorly on
Occupational Segregation by reverse occupational segmentation (e.g., if men are overrepresented in a traditionally-female occupation); however, these situations would be relatively
rare, and likely would have to be analyzed by the EEOC on a case by case basis.
3) Glass Ceiling Component. This will be measured as 1 minus the proportion of managerial
and professional positions that are held by women in the industry. Attention to this component is
designed to encourage employers to eradicate hiring and promotion discrimination, as well as
institute programs to encourage and assist women in reaching the upper levels of organizations.
4) Hiring Component. This measure is simply the proportion of occupations represented in each
firm in which women are under-represented relative to the relevant labor market. Or this
component could be modified to consider the degree of under-representation in hiring for each
occupation. For example, if only 25 percent of occupation A is made up of women in an
industry, whereas market-wide, 60 percent of that occupation is made up of women, then women
are considered under-represented in that occupation in that industry. If women are underrepresented in 25 percent of all occupations in an industry, then the industry's Hiring Component
would be equal to 0.25. Attention to this component will encourage employers to devote
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attention to their recruitment and selection practices to ensure that they do not result in hiring
discrimination.
5) Related discrimination component. This component is comprised of the outcome
measures on the first four components across racial/ethnic lines. This component is designed
to recognize the potential interconnectedness of race, gender, and other types of
discrimination, and the potential for employers who are discriminatory in one area (e.g.,
gender) to be discriminatory in other areas. Supporting this approach, there is a large
literature on the inter-relatedness of gender and race, and how being a woman and a member
of a racial or ethnic minority group could result in greater levels of discrimination (see for
example, Browne and Misra, 2003).

A key issue in constructing the Scorecard is the way in which the five components are
combined into a single number. We recommend calculation of the simple arithmetic mean. The
arithmetic mean Scorecard for industry j is given by:
IAj =

1 5
∑ Cij ,
5 i=1

where Ci is the ith component for industry j. The advantage of the arithmetic mean is that it is a
well-known statistic representing a linear average of each of the components. Since all
components of the Scorecard are measured on a scale between 0 and 1, the arithmetic mean
seems a reasonable choice. A disadvantage is that each component is equally weighted and that
extremely poor performance in one are can be exactly offset by extremely good performance in
another area. Of course different weights can be applied to the different components as might be
deemed necessary by past poor performance in one area or by a particular policy emphasis of the
evaluator.
36

Table I. Sample Means (std. dev.) for the Year 2000, By Industry.

Service

Transportation,
Commmunication, Utilities

0.35

0.08

Retail &
Wholesale
Trade
0.22

0.35

0.64

0.28

0.50

$16.65
(9.69)

$16.79
(9.67)

$15.72
(10.80)

$17.93
(11.38)

$12.75
(8.55)

40.81
(8.29)

42.06
(8.71)

42.11
(6.67)

38.60
(10.81)

42.10
(9.90)

39.50
(10.13)

0.15

0.14

0.09

0.14

0.18

0.17

0.14

College (1=yes)

0.19

0.31

0.08

0.16

0.23

0.17

0.14

Union (1=yes)

0.09

0.01

0.17

0.15

0.06

0.26

0.05

Professional

0.28

0.36

0.14

0.24

0.43

0.21

0.12

Technical

0.31

0.59

0.07

0.17

0.25

0.28

0.51

Service

0.12

0.03

0.003

0.01

0.23

0.03

0.17

Craft

0.13

0.02

0.56

0.19

0.05

0.16

0.07

Labor

0.16

0.004

0.23

0.39

0.04

0.32

0.12

33,662

2,692

2,540

6,862

11,671

2,640

7,257

Mining,
Construc- Manufacturing
tion
0.08
0.20

Full
Sample
1.00

Finance,
Insurance,
Real Estate
0.08

0.48

0.64

0.10

Wage/hr

$15.78
(10.39)

$18.43
(12.38)

Hours/wk

40.24
(9.62)

Nonwhite (1=yes)

Proportion of all
workers
Proportion female

Occupation:

No. of Obs.

Note: Professional occupation encompasses professional, administrative, and managerial
occupations. Technical occupation encompasses technical and related support. Service
occupation encompasses service only. Craft occupation encompasses precision production, craft,
and repair occupations. Labor occupation includes handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and
laborers.
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Table II. Industry EEO Scorecard and Standardized Scorecards for the Year 2000.

Retail &
Wholesale
Trade

Market
Average
(std dev)

Finance,
Insurance,
Real Estate

Mining,
Construction

Manufacturing

Service

Transportation,
Commmunication, Utilities

Equal Pay

0.2487
-1.298

0.1998
0.8876

0.2340
-0.641

0.1938
1.1572

0.2347
-0.673

0.2070
0.568

0.2197
(0.0224)

Occupational
Segregation

0.1743
0.752

0.6966
-1.751

0.1657
0.793

0.2619
0.3323

0.4609
-0.621

0.2280
0.4947

0.3312
(0.2087)

Glass Ceiling

0.4252
1.095

0.7545
-1.123

0.6876
-0.672

0.4118
1.1852

0.7027
-0.774

0.5448
0.2894

0.5878
(0.1485)

Hiring

0.4000
0.707

0.6000
0

0.6000
0

0.2000
1.4142

1.0000
-1.414

0.8000
-0.707

0.6000
(0.2828)

Related
Discrimination

0.2440
1.230

0.4864
-1.05

0.4450
-0.657

0.2633
1.0627

0.3492
0.2495

0.4654
-0.851

0.3755
(0.1056)

Overall
Industry
Scorecard

0.2984
1.047

0.5275
-1.109

0.4065
-0.032

0.2595
1.2753

0.5162
-1.008

0.4224
-0.174

0.4028
(0.1124)

Scorecard
Component

Note: The values in bold type correspond to the standardized value of the component. The
standardized score is calculated as the market average for that component minus the industry's
score on that component, divided by the market standard deviation for that component.
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EEO Scorecard Range

Figure IA. Range Chart for EEO Scorecard, by Employer
(Over 5-Year Period)
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UCL (poor)

LCL (good)

EEO Scorecard Value

Figure IB. X-Bar Chart for EEO Scorecard in Year 2000, by Employer
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0
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Figure II. Industry EEO Performance Over Time
Standardized Index
2
1.5

SRV ( β̂ = -.019)*

1

FIN ( β̂ = .050)**

0.5
0

MAN ( β̂ = .00)
TRD ( β̂ = -.03)

-0.5

TCU ( β̂ = -.01)

-1

MC ( β̂ = .02)

-1.5
-2
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Year
Significance:

* p > .05

** p > .01

Notes
FIN - Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
MC - Mining, Construction
MAN – Manufacturing
SRV - Service
TCU - Transportation, Communication, Utilities
TRD - Retail & Wholesale Trade
Estimated trend coefficients ( β̂ ) are reported along with their significance levels.
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1

We choose to focus on industry, rather than other potential common causes of employer actions

such as business strategy (Short, Ketchen, Palmer and Hult, 2007), because of the difficulties in
accessing competitive information on individual employers.
2

SPC practitioners attempt to balance and minimize Type I errors (i.e., finding a specific cause of

variation when there is none) and Type II errors (i.e., not detecting a specific cause of variation
when one exists) when developing and using control charts (Shewhart, 1939; Deming, 1986). Initial
total quality management efforts, reflecting the systems focus of the engineering profession,
minimized the potential for Type I errors (Bayart, 2006). Six Sigma programs continue this tradition
but more heavily emphasize the reduction of Type II errors (Kolesar, 1993a).
3

Non-construction contractors with 50 or more employees and $50,000 or more in business with

the federal government, are required “to develop and implement a written affirmative action
program (AAP) for each establishment” (U.S. DOL, 2008e). Construction contractors and
subcontractors with $10,000 or more in federal business are also subject to affirmative action
requirements, but their plans and goals are developed by the OFCCP.
4

In Fiscal Year 2007 the EEOC spent $14,983,933 on training and outreach excluding revenue

generated; with a total of $286,937,746 spent on private sector efforts (U.S. EEOC, 2007b).
5

The variable of occupation will influence employment processes and EEO outcomes as well (Blau

et al., 2006). However, we focus on industry in this paper because of the natural contrast it provides
to the employer-focused enforcement policies of the EEOC and the OFCCP, combined with the fact
that employing firms are nested within industries. This decision also looks ahead to our later
discussion of policy-making implications.
6

The other major OFCCP enforcement tool is de-barment of federal contractors, an option which is

rarely employed (Leonard, 1990). For example from 2000-2007, it appears that less than 10
contractors were de-barred (epls.gov, March 28, 2008).
7

Related components can be added for other protected groups, such as the disabled.

8

Examination of firm-level EEO outcomes will rely primarily on outlier identification rather than

pattern identification. For a summary of patterns of instability by Western Electric, Boeing, and
others, see: http://www.qualitytrainingportal.com/resources/spc/spc_adv_patterns_instability.htm.
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9

The threshold for intervention or assistance will depend upon policy makers balancing of Type I

and Type II errors as well as the economic costs of pursuing and correcting special causes (Nelson,
2003).
10

The statistical process control literature also recommends studying positive outliers for evidence

of best practices that could be shared with others. Just as the identification of negative outliers
should be systematic and based upon the principles of SPC, so too should the identification of
positive outliers. Neither the EEOC nor the OFCCP employ SPC-level process to recognize stellar
employers; however, we do not discuss this issue further as our focus is on employers with poor
EEO performance.
11

The observations that comprise the range calculations are not independent in that employers’ EEO

performance in earlier years will affect later EEO performance.
12

Due to the small size of the agriculture industry and the unique features of the public sector, the

Agriculture and Public Administration industries are excluded from the present analysis.
13

The sample sizes for each year are as follows: 1989 - 37,093; 1990 - 40,924; 1991 – 40,808; 1992

– 40,346; 1993 – 39,828; 1994 – 36,235; 1995 – 31,840; 1996 – 32,042; 1997 – 32,781; 1998 –
32,936; 1999 – 32,751; 2000 – 33,662.
14

The standardized score is calculated as the market average for that component minus the

industry's score on that component, divided by the market standard deviation for that component.
15

The Equal Pay Component is measured by occupations within industries, which is the closest

approximation possible with CPS data. If employer-level data were available, the preferred measure
would consist of jobs within firms.
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